Did CERN Cause the German Airbus A320 crash?

PaulaJedi

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#1
It didn't take long for the conspiracies to start rolling in. Now, people are relating the launch of the CERN LHC to the A320 crash. Problem is, CERN never fired up the LHC due to electrical problems. Some people disagree.

I don't know. It's going to take a lot to convince me they are related, but I just wanted to throw this out there. The latest news I heard was that one of the pilots was possibly locked out of the cockpit. (Almost sounds like someone wanted to commit suicide).

http://allnewspipeline.com/Did_CERN_Bring_Down_German_Plane_Theories_Begin.php
 

PaulaJedi

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#3
\ said:
It looks like this fellow suffering from depression may have decided to take his woes out on a lot of innocent people - https://www.facebook.com/andreas.lubitz.3
Yes, that's terrible. He murdered innocent people. I can't feel sorry for him. I also knew someone would cry conspiracy. They always do. It was his OWN personal conspiracy, though, not CERN.
 

Mylo.X.

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#4
As has already pointed out, the aircrash was nothing to do with CERN. Apparently, it was due to a cowardly individual who was suffering with mental health issues. Instead of taking his own life, he pathetically took the lives of numerous other people. There needs to be some type of safeguard against the forced closure of a cockpit (and overide) from the inside.
 

Dizzie

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#5
\ said:
As has already pointed out, the aircrash was nothing to do with CERN. Apparently, it was due to a cowardly individual who was suffering with mental health issues. Instead of taking his own life, he pathetically took the lives of numerous other people. There needs to be some type of safeguard against the forced closure of a cockpit (and overide) from the inside.
Kind of a catch-22 it seems, since the secured door was instituted in order to keep attackers out. Might be hard to have it both ways. Maybe the pilot override that keeps the door locked even when a correct code is being entered from the outside is a bad idea? I'm sure there is a reason behind it.
 

PaulaJedi

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#6
\ said:
Kind of a catch-22 it seems, since the secured door was instituted in order to keep attackers out. Might be hard to have it both ways. Maybe the pilot override that keeps the door locked even when a correct code is being entered from the outside is a bad idea? I'm sure there is a reason behind it.
Exactly. The other pilot should always be able to get in. There should be some type of control override elsewhere in the plane, too, perhaps to allow the plane to fly itself to safer place...???? BUT I'm sure this happened really fast. It's so sad. We trust and rely on these pilots to bring us places safely and one goes and does something like this. It's really hard to have compassion for that man.
 

RainmanTime

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#7
No, obviously global warming caused the crash. Can't you see it? {/sarc}

\ said:
There needs to be some type of safeguard against the forced closure of a cockpit (and overide) from the inside.
It is a bad idea to continually add technical design solutions on top of existing technical design solutions to low probability events. It not only drives up the cost of the airplane, but drives up the cost of operating the airplane, AND each new design feature on top of existing design features also INCREASES the chance of a failure mode which defeats the entire purpose of one of the design safeguards. Engineering cannot solve "people problems" and, in fact, when we aerospace engineers do our safety analysis of our designs, the certification agencies do NOT force us to try to quantify the probability that the human does the wrong thing. Because what sort of probability could one reasonably assign to such an event, and how would you show it is a valid probability? Our designs DO sometimes contain features that protect against the human doing the wrong thing (e.g. autopilot airspeed command selections are limited to within the safe operating envelope so the machine will never let the human select a speed that is too slow or too fast), but as you add more and more of these features without a valid safety probability of hazard model, you begin to see other, negative effects of these design solutions.

\ said:
Exactly. The other pilot should always be able to get in.
Ah, the opinions of the lay public. It is easy for the non-professionals to levy what sounds like such a simple requirement. But you have never had to take this requirement, do ALL of the deep analysis of how it must be implemented (deriving more detailed design requirements that respond to this high level thought), and then have to come up with a design solution that meets the intended function more than 99.99% of the time, but also does NOT introduce hazardous or catastrophic failures modes when the design solution is implemented.

What is really going on here is you are making a judgment out of ignorance for how the existing design should be changed. I say out of ignorance because you have no understanding of why the design is the way it is to begin with. I can shed light on why it is this way.

There are three modes mandated for how the cockpit door is to be locked/unlocked. These three modes are:

1) Unlocked

2) Normal

3) Locked

In the case of Normal, this is where the door is actually locked to people from the outside, BUT it does allow a crew member who knows the code to enter it on the code pad and overrride the lock. So the natural question for the uninformed is "why do you need the locked mode?". The locked mode is where the flight crew inside the cockpit can PREVENT the code override feature, as we saw in this accident. The REASON that feature is mandated is because forward-thinking engineers KNEW there was a very real (and very probable) risk of that access code being compromised. Just like there is a very real probability that hackers can figure out passwords and compromise the security of many of your computer accounts.

So, the LOCKED mode was mandated in the design to address the very real (not remote) probability that the code was compromised by a criminal. This mode is based upon the presumption that adequate screening of flight crews has been done such that we believe we could prevent situations like this A320 case from happening. But obviously, human controls are more susceptible to failure than design controls because of human variability, and the ability of a human to hide things about their intentions.

Engineering cannot solve ALL human security problems without unintended consequences. If we tried to, either you would not be able to afford the final system, would not be able to prove it is effective at least 99.99% of the time, or it would possess failure modes that result in diminishing returns from having attempted to implement it.

RMT
 
#8
\ said:
Kind of a catch-22 it seems, since the secured door was instituted in order to keep attackers out. Might be hard to have it both ways. Maybe the pilot override that keeps the door locked even when a correct code is being entered from the outside is a bad idea? I'm sure there is a reason behind it.
I guess they need to get a better idea for that lock. It was terrible what happened to those people, but I think there had to be a way they could have prevented it from happening in the first place. Even having a 3 person in the cockpit could have saved those people. That third person could have unlocked the door to let the pilot in or stopped the co pilot all together. They should basically make a position called "Chaperone". The person has nothing to do with flying the plane (though flight knowledge would be a plus for the job). Their job is just to sit in the cockpit as a third person for security reasons.
 

Dizzie

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#9
\ said:
...

There are three modes mandated for how the cockpit door is to be locked/unlocked. These three modes are:

1) Unlocked

2) Normal

3) Locked

In the case of Normal, this is where the door is actually locked to people from the outside, BUT it does allow a crew member who knows the code to enter it on the code pad and overrride the lock. So the natural question for the uninformed is "why do you need the locked mode?". The locked mode is where the flight crew inside the cockpit can PREVENT the code override feature, as we saw in this accident. The REASON that feature is mandated is because forward-thinking engineers KNEW there was a very real (and very probable) risk of that access code being compromised. Just like there is a very real probability that hackers can figure out passwords and compromise the security of many of your computer accounts.

So, the LOCKED mode was mandated in the design to address the very real (not remote) probability that the code was compromised by a criminal. This mode is based upon the presumption that adequate screening of flight crews has been done such that we believe we could prevent situations like this A320 case from happening. But obviously, human controls are more susceptible to failure than design controls because of human variability, and the ability of a human to hide things about their intentions.

Engineering cannot solve ALL human security problems without unintended consequences. If we tried to, either you would not be able to afford the final system, would not be able to prove it is effective at least 99.99% of the time, or it would possess failure modes that result in diminishing returns from having attempted to implement it.

RMT
Very interesting and authoritative information regarding the background of aerospace engineering. A lot of good things to consider alongside this tragic event and what will come of it.

\ said:
...It is a bad idea to continually add technical design solutions on top of existing technical design solutions to low probability events. It not only drives up the cost of the airplane, but drives up the cost of operating the airplane, AND each new design feature on top of existing design features also INCREASES the chance of a failure mode which defeats the entire purpose of one of the design safeguards. Engineering cannot solve "people problems" and, in fact, when we aerospace engineers do our safety analysis of our designs, the certification agencies do NOT force us to try to quantify the probability that the human does the wrong thing. Because what sort of probability could one reasonably assign to such an event, and how would you show it is a valid probability? Our designs DO sometimes contain features that protect against the human doing the wrong thing (e.g. autopilot airspeed command selections are limited to within the safe operating envelope so the machine will never let the human select a speed that is too slow or too fast), but as you add more and more of these features without a valid safety probability of hazard model, you begin to see other, negative effects of these design solutions.

...
Interesting perspective on engineering theory and the myriad of variables that are dealt with in deceptively small features! At the same time, it seems to me that if you consider "people problems" to be variables of human nature that they are indeed a part of engineering. Even the potential eventuality of hacking an entry code seems a human behavioral problem that the cockpit override is attempting to solve for. Your point is well taken, though, that solving all security risk would seem quite impossible.

\ said:
...

Ah, the opinions of the lay public. It is easy for the non-professionals to levy what sounds like such a simple requirement. But you have never had to take this requirement, do ALL of the deep analysis of how it must be implemented (deriving more detailed design requirements that respond to this high level thought), and then have to come up with a design solution that meets the intended function more than 99.99% of the time, but also does NOT introduce hazardous or catastrophic failures modes when the design solution is implemented.

What is really going on here is you are making a judgment out of ignorance for how the existing design should be changed. I say out of ignorance because you have no understanding of why the design is the way it is to begin with. I can shed light on why it is this way.

...
While I enjoyed reading your expert opinions, the tone of some of your response comes off as somewhat smug and elitist in my opinion, which is a bit disconcerting. While it may be entirely appropriate when directed toward a group of tuition-paying students, it seems a bit unfriendly in a casual discussion forum. And while it may not be intentional on anyone's part, I can understand Paula's feeling that her responses have been targeted throughout the forum.

\ said:
...

I am sorry that your mother didn't love you as a child, which is probably why you find me to be a threat. You can't stand to see a woman with an opinion here. But that should be between you and your therapist and shouldn't involve me.

Thank you, sunshine! Have a nice day.
Your return insult, Paula, is quite harsh, flippant, and uncalled for. This tactic is not the answer.

I have genuinely enjoyed reading remarks and information by the both of you here on TTI. I am certainly no better myself than this last spirited exchange and have done much worse, maybe just not here on this particular forum. Just providing what I hope is a somewhat subjective viewpoint in hopes of peaceful coexistence and continued conversations.

Thanks